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Summary
In 2002 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted 
a resolution containing the Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition 
and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines). This is the first instrument 
adopted by the African Commission focused solely on preventing torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment. Ten years on, the article aims to examine 
the background to the adoption of the Robben Island Guidelines in order 
to explore the motives behind their development and to identify reasons 
for their subsequent lack of impact. The article will demonstrate that the 
context and institutional setting within which the Robben Island Guidelines 
were developed have had an impact on their level of implementation. The 
article arises out of a four-year research project, funded by the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council in the United Kingdom, which is examining 
the implementation of soft law through an analysis of the use of the 
Robben Island Guidelines in practice. Through an analysis of this one 
document, the article hopes to offer some lessons for the drafting, use 
and relevance of other soft law documents in human rights law.
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1  Introduction
In 2002 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Commission) adopted a resolution containing the Guidelines 
and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben 
Island Guidelines or RIG). The RIG were the result of a three-day 
expert workshop that took place between 11 and 14 February 2002 
in Cape Town and on Robben Island, South Africa. The RIG contain 
a series of provisions concerned with the prohibition and prevention 
of torture and other ill-treatment and responding to the needs of 
victims. It is the first instrument adopted by the African Commission 
focused solely on preventing torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 
With the adoption of the RIG, the African Commission, unusually for 
a non-binding document, also resolved to establish a committee to, 
among other things, develop strategies and ‘promote and facilitate 
the implementation’ of the RIG.1
At the tenth anniversary of the RIG, the aim of this article is to explore 
the background to their adoption in order to shed some light on their 
intended purpose. It will track the drafting process, examining the 
reasons for their development and subsequent adoption by the African 
Commission. It will demonstrate that the context and institutional 
setting within which this particular piece of soft law has developed 
have had an impact on their level of implementation. It will argue 
that, in order for such a document to have a use beyond its adoption, 
a coherent strategy needs to be considered when the document is 
being drafted as to how it will be employed and what purpose it is to 
serve. In the context of the RIG, we will argue that there was a lack of 
clarity on whether the RIG were planned as a policy tool to achieve 
ratification of an international instrument, or as a device for strategic 
development at the regional level, or whether they were intended as 
a practical tool for training and advocacy at the national level. As a 
result, the subsequent use of the RIG has been disappointing, both 
within and outside of the African Commission. Through an analysis of 
this one document, the article hopes, therefore, to offer some lessons 
for the drafting, use and relevance of other soft law documents in 
human rights law.
1 ACHPR Res 61 (XXXII) 02 Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition 
and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines) 2008, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/
robben-island-guidelines-2008/ (accessed 31 October 2012).
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2   Where did the idea for a specific instrument on the 
prohibition and prevention of torture and other ill-
treatment in Africa come from?
Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment 
(other ill-treatment)2 are prohibited under article 5 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).
The African Commission has been the main body mandated to 
monitor state parties’ compliance with their obligations under the 
African Charter. The African Commission has established a number 
of procedures by which it carries out its mandate, namely, the 
consideration of periodic state reports;3 the examination of individual 
and inter-state communications;4 promotional and fact-finding 
missions to states; and the creation of special mechanisms (Special 
Rapporteurs; working groups or committees) for specific issues. Over 
the years, numerous alleged violations of article 5 have been considered 
by the African Commission under these procedures and mechanisms. 
Notwithstanding these activities, towards the end of the 1990s there 
was a call from an international non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), the Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), for the 
African Commission to develop a more strategic approach to tackling 
torture and other ill-treatment, in particular by establishing some form 
of special mechanism with the mandate to work on torture prevention 
and to consider developing a specific instrument concerned with the 
prohibition and prevention of torture and other ill-treatment in Africa.
At the 27th ordinary session of the African Commission held 
between 27 April and 8 May 2000, the APT issued a statement and 
submitted a position paper outlining the reasons for the prevalence 
of torture and other ill-treatment in Africa and called upon the 
African Commission to address the question of torture prevention, 
including by the establishment of an ‘inter-African Committee or 
Special Commissioner’ and considering the development of an African 
declaration on the prevention of torture.5
This call for an African declaration and special mechanism on torture 
prevention was made to address concerns that the African Commission 
lacked ‘a coherent strategy towards the prohibition and prevention of 
torture and other ill-treatment in Africa’.6
2 In this article torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment will be referred to as torture and other ill-treatment.
3 Art 62 African Charter.
4 Arts 47-59 African Charter.
5 Position Paper of the APT submitted to the 27th ordinary session of the African 
Commission (2000), copy filed with the Human Rights Implementation Centre, 
University of Bristol.
6 As above.
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There would appear to be some merit in this criticism of the African 
Commission’s approach to the prevention of torture. For instance, 
while states had traditionally included information on measures taken 
to comply with article 5 in their periodic reports, these lacked detail 
and tended to focus almost exclusively on the extent to which the 
prohibition of torture had been enacted in the Constitution or other 
legislation and did not include information on the prevalence of these 
forms of abuse and efforts to address any problems at the national 
level. In addition, under the individual communications procedure, 
the African Commission’s decisions in relation to alleged article 5 
violations were at times inconsistent or unnecessarily restrictive.7
As well as strengthening the regional approach to torture, the APT 
were also particularly keen to ensure that the issue of the prevention 
of torture and other ill-treatment was placed firmly on the agenda of 
the African Commission at this time because of events happening at 
the international level.
Since its establishment in 1977, and particularly during the 1980s and 
1990s, the APT was heavily involved with negotiations at the United 
Nations (UN) to develop an Optional Protocol to the UN Convention 
against Torture (OPCAT), which would establish a new treaty body 
to visit places of detention and make recommendations aimed at the 
prevention of torture and other ill-treatment. It was in the context 
of these negotiations that the APT considered lobbying the African 
Commission to develop an instrument on torture prevention in Africa.
It was believed by the APT that developing a ‘home-grown’ 
instrument to provide a focus on the prevention of torture and 
other ill-treatment would assist with the process of building political 
consensus in Africa around the concept of the prevention of torture 
and other ill-treatment.8 Not only would this assist regional efforts 
to tackle torture and other ill-treatment, but this could also be used 
as a political leverage at the international level to encourage African 
states to support the draft OPCAT by demonstrating that the concept 
of preventive visits to places of detention had broad regional support 
and was not an idea imposed by the international or European 
communities.
As well as developing an instrument that could be used to promote 
the concept of torture prevention within Africa, the creation of a new 
special mechanism was also central to the APT’s regional strategy to 
raise the profile of torture prevention within the African Commission. 
This strategy was driven, on the one hand, by the emerging use 
of special mechanisms as a means for NGOs to try and keep their 
issues ‘alive’ and placing them at the heart of the work of the African 
7 See J Mujuzi ‘An analysis of the approach to the right to freedom from torture 
adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 6 
African Human Rights Law Journal 423 434-435.
8 As above.
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Commission, and, on the other hand, it may have been a strategic 
decision to ensure that even without a text for the OPCAT being 
adopted at the UN, there would at least be a body established at the 
regional level that was mandated to work on torture prevention.
Since 1994 and the establishment of the special mechanism system by 
the African Commission, the creation of Special Rapporteurs was seen 
by NGOs as a useful way in which their particular issues and agenda 
could receive a certain prominence within the African Commission.9 
It was a clear strategy of the APT from the start to push for a new 
special mechanism with a specific torture prevention mandate, rather 
than calling for the Special Rapporteur on Prisons to develop a more 
coherent torture prevention strategy within this existing mandate.
This is instructive of the importance felt by NGOs on having a 
special mechanism established specifically to raise the profile of a 
particular human right. Thus, while successive Special Rapporteurs 
had considered issues relating to torture and other ill-treatment while 
carrying out their mandate, albeit in an inconsistent manner,10 it was 
perhaps felt by the APT that issues relating to torture prevention could 
be ‘lost’ within the broader mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
Prisons and the best chance of raising the profile of their issue within 
the African Commission was through the establishment of a new 
special mechanism that was clearly identified with the prevention of 
torture and other ill-treatment.
In addition, the strategy of creating a regional body mandated to 
prevent torture had already been successfully deployed by the APT in 
Europe in the 1980s when negotiations on OPCAT were on hold. During 
this hiatus in the OPCAT negotiations, the APT were instrumental in 
the process that led to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe adopting the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 
1987.11 This Convention established the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT), an expert body mandated to carry out 
visits where people are deprived of their liberty by a public authority 
within state parties and to make recommendations to the authorities 
aimed at preventing torture and other forms of ill-treatment.12 While 
the intention of the APT may not have been to replicate exactly the 
CPT in Africa, the establishment of regional bodies to act as a focal 
point for torture prevention activities was regarded as an effective 
9 See J Harrington ‘Special Rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 251; R Murray ‘The 
Special Rapporteurs in the African system’ in M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The system in practice 1986-2006 (2008) 
373-374.
10 See Murray (n 9 above) 208.
11 The European Convention on the Prevention of Torture came into force in 1989.
12 For more information on the CPT, see http://cpt.coe.int/en/ (accessed 31 October 
2012).
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strategy by the APT and was one of the main reasons behind the call 
for a special mechanism on torture prevention to be created by the 
African Commission.
Interestingly, the language used in this position paper concerning 
the creation of a special mechanism indicates that this body can be 
established independently from an instrument on torture prevention 
and that the two were not necessarily dependent on the other, 
notwithstanding that the APT states that a committee could monitor 
the implementation of a declaration. In fact, the language is slightly 
stronger in relation to the creation of a new special mechanism as the 
APT asks the African Commission expressly to establish one, whereas 
they ask the African Commission to ‘examine the appropriateness of 
developing a declaration’.13 However, in the end the RIG became a 
means by which a special mechanism could be established.
However, following the adoption of the RIG and the creation of 
a special mechanism to monitor their implementation, unlike the 
Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa, 
who did receive, for a period of time, direct external assistance to 
carry out its mandate, the APT did not provide financial support to 
the Follow-Up Committee on the RIG from the outset. Linked to this 
strategic decision was an event that had not been foreseen during the 
drafting of the RIG in 2002, namely, that in the same year that the 
RIG were drafted, a final text of OPCAT was finally adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. The adoption of OPCAT inevitably meant that the 
APT had to change its overall strategy and move its resources in order 
to respond to the creation of this new international instrument. These 
events and the strategic decisions that followed have had a direct 
impact on the purpose and effectiveness of the Committee that was 
established and the RIG.
3  Momentum gathers for an instrument on torture 
prevention in Africa
At the 28th ordinary session of the African Commission, held between 
23 October and 6 November 2000, the APT stated that they could 
organise jointly with the African Commission a workshop to develop a 
plan of action on the prevention of torture.14
Following this call, in January 2001 the Secretary of the African 
Commission informed the APT that the African Commission was in 
favour of the proposal to organise a workshop to draft an instrument 
on the prevention of torture and asked the APT to proceed with 
13 Position paper of the APT (n 5 above).
14 Oral statement made by Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero at the 28th ordinary 
session of the African Commission, 23 October-6 November 2000, copy filed with 
the Human Rights Implementation Centre, University of Bristol.
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the idea. Subsequently, the APT undertook a series of consultations 
with commissioners of the African Commission to consider the most 
appropriate way to move forward with the idea and what form such 
an instrument should take. During these consultations it was decided 
that it would not be appropriate to develop a binding instrument such 
as a convention for the prevention of torture in Africa for a number 
of pragmatic reasons. First, such an undertaking would be a lengthy 
process. Second, even if a convention was agreed upon and adopted, 
ratifications could take many years to obtain, particularly as many 
African states had not ratified the UN Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). 
Third, with the negotiations on OPCAT proving to be controversial 
and difficult, it was seen as too much of an undertaking for the APT 
to commence negotiations on a binding treaty at the regional level 
at the same time as lobbying at the international level.15 Accordingly, 
bearing in mind article 2 of CAT, which obliges each state party to 
‘take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures 
to prevent acts of torture’, it was agreed to develop some sort of 
‘guiding’ or non-binding instrument on the prevention of torture and 
other ill-treatment in Africa.
The reasoning behind this decision is illustrative of some of the key 
reasons for the development of soft law that have been identified by 
commentators. As Shelton notes, the soft law form may be used ‘when 
there are concerns about the possibility of non-compliance either 
because of domestic political opposition, lack of ability of capacity to 
comply, uncertainty about whether compliance can be measured, or 
disagreement with aspects of the proposed norm’.16 It has also been 
noted that soft law can allow for more active participation of non-
state actors and can be adopted or amended more rapidly because it 
is non-binding.17
At the 29th ordinary session of the African Commission, held 
between 23 April and 7 May 2001, the APT presented a confidential 
draft position paper to the African Commission which outlined details 
of the expert workshop. The plan of action to be drafted was to ‘contain 
concrete proposals, measures and mechanisms to ensure improved 
prevention’,18 and would be presented for possible adoption by the 
African Commission and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).19
15 Interview with Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, 10 November 2009.
16 D Shelton ‘Law, non-law and the problem of soft law’ in D Shelton (ed) Commitment 
and compliance. The role of non-binding norms in the international legal system 
(2000) 12.
17 Shelton (n 16 above) 13.
18 Oral Statement made by the APT at the 29th ordinary session of the African 
Commission.
19 As above.
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On the basis of article 45 of the African Charter, which mandates the 
African Commission to, inter alia, formulate and lay down principles 
and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and 
peoples’ rights, the APT were of the firm belief that no matter what form 
the plan of action or instrument took, in order for it to have political 
legitimacy within Africa, the African Commission must be involved 
with the drafting process and the final product should be adopted by 
the Commission.20 It was considered that this would ensure that the 
instrument was perceived as an instrument of the African Commission 
and not that of an international NGO or something imposed from an 
external process. As noted earlier, this was part of the APT’s overall 
regional strategy to create an instrument that could be considered 
to be ‘home-grown’, as it was believed that this would increase 
the chances that such an instrument would be used by the African 
Commission and gain greater acceptance from states.
The African Commission was now committed to moving ahead with 
the proposal and, during the 30th ordinary session of the Commission, 
held between 13 and 27 October 2001, the commissioners met with 
the APT in private in order to discuss the final details of the workshop.21 
It was decided that the workshop would be held in South Africa in 
February 2002 and that all or part of the workshop would take place 
on Robben Island. Robben Island was suggested as a venue for the 
workshop because it was believed that the final instrument could 
benefit from the symbolism attached to the island.22
The workshop to draft the Robben Island Guidelines was held 
between 12 and 14 February 2002 and brought together 27 individuals, 
including representatives from the African Commission, the European 
CPT, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), national 
police services and civil society organisations, the majority of whom 
were from the region.23 Prior to the workshop, the participants were 
20 Interview with Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, 10 November 2009.
21 As above.
22 n 20 above.
23 The participants were Mr Andrew Chigovera, commissioner of the African 
Commission and Attorney-General of Zimbabwe; Mr Barney Pityana, 
commissioner of the African Commission; Mr Germaine Baricako, Secretary to 
the Africa Commission; Mrs Fiona Adolu, Legal Officer to the African Commission; 
Prof Renate Kicker, professor at the University of Graz, Austria and member of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture; Mr Jody Kollapen, Deputy 
Chairperson of the South African Human Rights Commission; Mrs Antoinette Brink, 
South African Police Services; Mr Ephrem Gasasira, member of the Brussels Bar; 
Mrs Misie Mosarwa, Legal Officer for the Botswana Police Service; Prof Malcolm 
Evans, professor at the University of Bristol, UK; Mr Mabassa Fall, International 
Federation for Human Rights (based in Senegal); Mrs Karen McKensie, executive 
director of the Independent Complaints Directorate of South Africa; Mr Shadrack 
Mahlangu, officer at the Independent Complaints Directorate in South Africa; 
Mr Tommy Tshabalala, officer at the Independent Complaints Directorate of South 
Africa; Mrs Hannah Forster, executive director for the African Centre for Democracy 
and Human Rights Studies (based in The Gambia); Mr Guy Aurenche, International 
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informed that the purpose of the workshop was to draft a ‘plan of 
action’ to prevent torture and other ill-treatment and the expected 
plan of action would contain regional and national measures for the 
prevention of torture relating to three main themes:24
(i) legal measures (normative framework);
(ii) control measures (control mechanisms); and
(iii) training and empowerment.
The workshop was run over three days with an ambitious schedule to 
draft a ‘plan of action’ within this short space of time. Consequently, in 
order to facilitate the drafting process, the APT had previously prepared 
an initial outline of an instrument to be amended as necessary to 
reflect the discussions of the workshop.25 This preliminary document 
was entitled ‘Ideas and Principles for Possible Inclusion in the Draft 
Robben Island Plan of Action’. In the introduction it was stated that26
the Plan of Action will not only provide guidelines and serve as a tool for 
states, thereto meet their obligations on prohibition [sic] and prevention 
of torture, but it will also serve as an indicator by all actors concerned, 
helping them to act effectively for the prevention of torture.
In fact, this preliminary document does not resemble a ‘plan of action’ 
with precise and measurable steps to be taken by states and other 
actors to prevent torture and other ill-treatment. The document is quite 
long and contains 63 provisions derived from existing instruments 
relating to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, including 
CAT; the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(UN SMR); the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons 
under Any Form of Detention of Imprisonment; the European Prison 
Rules; and ‘standards’ elaborated by the European CPT through their 
recommendations to countries following a visit. Interestingly, the 
document did not make a reference to existing regional instruments 
Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (FIACAT) (based 
in France); Dr Tertius Geldenhuys, South African Police Services; Mrs Henrietta 
Didgu, legal officer of the Economic Community of West Africa States (based 
in Nigeria); Mr Patrick Zahnd, International Committee of the Red Cross (based 
in South Africa); Father Michael Lapsley, Institute for Healing and Memories 
(based in South Africa); Prof Shabbir Wadee, Department of Forensic Medicine at 
Stellenbosch University (based in South Africa); Mrs Shelia Keetharuth, Amnesty 
International (based in Mauritius); Mr Vincent Saldanha, Legal Resources Centre 
(based in South Africa); Mr Honore Tougouri, President of the African Penitentiary 
Association (based in Burkina Faso); Mr Marco Mona, President of the APT (based 
in Switzerland); Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, APT Africa Programme Officer 
(based in Switzerland); and Ms Debra Long, APT Programme Advisor (based in 
Switzerland).
24 Letter to Prof Malcolm Evans dated 13 November 2002 [sic], copy filed with the 
Human Rights Implementation Centre, University of Bristol.
25 APT Ideas and principles for possible inclusion in the Draft Robben Island Plan of 
Action, filed with the Human Rights Implementation Centre, University of Bristol.
26 As above.
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relevant to the prevention of torture and other ill-treatment in Africa, 
such as the Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa.27 One 
of the reasons for this is that the original drafters of the preliminary 
document were more familiar with the relevant UN and European 
instruments relating to the treatment of persons deprived of their 
liberty and conditions of detention,28 and the UN instruments, in 
particular, were regarded as useful because of their level of detail and 
broad acceptance by the international community.
This preliminary document was not shared with all of the workshop 
participants as it was felt by the APT that it would be counter-
productive to present a draft document for discussion as this might 
be perceived as presenting a document as a fait accompli, whereas 
the APT wanted the final product to be seen as emanating from the 
participants of the workshop and not from a single international NGO. 
It was believed by the APT that this would help to ensure that the 
final instrument was regarded as an African-owned instrument that 
reflected African concerns. Therefore, this preliminary document was 
only shared with a few members of the workshop who were selected 
by the APT to form a core drafting group, which met at the end of each 
day to amend the preliminary draft to reflect the focus of discussions.29 
Accordingly, the majority of the drafting process was not in fact done 
during the plenary sessions of the workshop, but actually carried out 
by this core drafting group of seven individuals. Furthermore, while 
some of the wording of this preliminary document was altered over 
the course of the workshop, the overall approach and format of this 
document was to have a significant impact on the final content and 
structure of the RIG.
The workshop was co-chaired by Commissioner Andrew Chigovera 
(then Attorney-General of Zimbabwe) and Mr Marco Mona (President 
of the APT). The first day of the workshop was taken up with 
presentations from some of the participants of the workshop, focusing 
on four broad themes: legal measures; control measures; rehabilitation 
and reparation; and training and empowerment to prevent torture 
27 This was drafted between 21 and 26 September 1996 at an expert workshop 
organised by Penal Reform International, the African Commission, the Uganda 
Prison Services, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Foundation 
for Human Rights Initiative and the Observatorie International des Prisons. See 
http://www.penalreform.org/files/rep-1996-kampala-declaration-en.pdf (accessed 
31 October 2012).
28 The preliminary draft was prepared by Mr Niyizurugero, APT Africa Programme 
Officer and Ms Long, APT Programme Advisor.
29 The members of this core drafting team were Mrs Adolu, legal officer to the African 
Commission; Mr Baricako, Secretary to the African Commission; Prof Evans, Bristol 
University; Mrs Forster, Executive Director of the African Centre for Democracy 
and Human Rights Studies, The Gambia; Prof Kicker, member of the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Austria; Ms Long; and Mr Niyizurugero.
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and other ill-treatment.30 At the end of the first day, the core drafting 
group met to discuss and amend the preliminary document.
On the morning of the second day, more presentations were made to 
the plenary, while two members of the core drafting group finalised in 
private the draft document to be shared with the other participants.31
On the afternoon of the second day of the workshop, the document 
from the core drafting group was presented for discussion to the 
participants of the workshop. There were some provisions within the 
first draft that proved to be divisive among the workshop, namely, 
the inclusion of a reference to the abolition of the death penalty, 
recognition of judicial corporal punishment as a form of torture and 
other ill-treatment, a call for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over 
acts of torture, and no immunity from prosecution for former heads of 
state for acts of torture.
On the third day, the workshop was moved to Robben Island. 
In the end, the discussions on the last day proved to be less contentious 
than the previous day, partly because the core drafters had managed 
to address some of the issues with carefully-crafted language. 
Accordingly, during this last day a further revised text was presented 
by the core drafting group and a final text was adopted by all the 
participants.
It can be seen from the above that during the workshop there was a 
heavy focus on presentations and the actual main drafting of the RIG 
took place within the core drafting group. This is instructive because, 
as noted earlier, the aim of the process was to produce a ‘home-grown’ 
instrument and one of the merits of the RIG has often been described 
as being the fact that it is ‘the work of Africans themselves’.32 However, 
in fact three of the seven members of the core drafting group were 
European,33 and two of the three primary drafters were European.34 
Yet, as noted earlier, the APT were always of the opinion that in 
order for the RIG to have political legitimacy within the region and 
therefore to be used and useful within the region, it was important 
for the instrument to be perceived as emanating from a process that 
could be regarded as an African initiative. Thus it was not necessarily 
who was involved with the actual wording of the instrument that 
was important, but rather the fact that an instrument would emanate 
from a workshop which the African Commission had co-chaired. This 
30 For further details of the presentations, see APT ‘Preventing torture in Africa: 
Proceedings of a joint APT-ACHPR Workshop, Robben Island, South Africa’ 
12-14 February 2002, APT, Geneva 2003.
31 The two members of the core drafting group who finalised the draft document 
were Prof Evans and Ms Long.
32 See J-B Niyizurugero & GP Lissène ‘The Robben Island Guidelines: An essential tool 
for the prevention of torture in Africa’ (2010) 6 Essex Human Rights Review 113.
33 Namely, Prof Kicker (Austria), Prof Evans and Ms Long (both from the UK).
34 The primary drafters were Prof Evans, Mr Niyizurugero and Ms Long.
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strategy enabled the African Commission to be directly associated 
with the end product of the workshop, which it was hoped would 
smooth the way for the final document to be adopted by the African 
Commission.
4  Key issues that arose during the workshop
As noted earlier, there were some issues that arose during the workshop 
that proved to be contentious and divisive, while a few issues were 
stressed as being particularly pertinent when addressing torture and 
other ill-treatment in Africa.
Even though one of the main initial motivations behind the drafting 
of the RIG was to develop a regional instrument that could help to 
promote the concept of visits to places of detention as a means to 
prevent torture and in turn be used to garner political support for 
OPCAT within the region, in fact very little discussion took place on 
these issues during the workshop and the final document contains 
only a few generic provisions that are concerned with OPCAT and 
preventive visits to places of detention. It is proposed that this is 
indicative of the fact that the purpose of the drafting process was, 
either deliberately or inadvertently, beginning to change and the RIG 
were becoming less linked to events occurring at the international 
level and to a certain extent taking on a ‘life of their own’. This is 
further evidenced by the preliminary document that the APT drew 
up as a basis for the discussions, which contained only three generic 
references to establishing and supporting visiting mechanisms.35 
Some of the possible reasons for this are, firstly, that in 2001 there was 
a change in leadership at the APT, which inevitably brought with it a 
change in their overall strategy. Secondly, the negotiations on OPCAT 
were at a crucial stage and to some extent events at the regional 
level had to take second place in the APT’s activities and strategy at 
that time. Thirdly, as noted above, the working document that the 
core drafting group revised on the basis of the discussions did not 
focus on preventive visits but was a much broader document dealing 
with different aspects of the prohibition and prevention of torture. 
This inevitably shaped the overall discussions and the final text. 
Accordingly, the issues that received most debate were concerned 
more with substantive issues of torture prevention rather than with 
OPCAT or visiting mechanisms.
4.1  Death penalty
Looking first at issues that were contentious, the preliminary 
document prepared by the APT, which served as starting point for the 
35 Ideas and principles (n 25 above) 5.
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discussions, contained a reference to the abolition of the death penalty. 
Under the general heading ‘Prohibition and sanctions of torture in 
national legislation’ addressed to governments, the document states 
as follows, ‘[t]ake steps to abolish the death penalty, and where it 
is still applied it shall be performed in conformity with recognised 
international standards’.36 A reference to the abolition of the death 
penalty remained in the working draft presented to the participants 
on the second day of the workshop. This draft had a more concise 
reference and stated ‘[t]ake steps to abolish the death penalty where 
it is still applied’.37
This provision was debated heavily during the plenary session. A 
few participants believed that this went too far and did not reflect the 
status of international law on the issue, which allows states to impose 
the death penalty under certain circumstances and with specific 
restrictions.38 However, many participants, particularly from civil 
society organisations, felt strongly that the document should make a 
reference to abolishing the death penalty as this was a pressing issue 
in the region where many states still retained capital punishment for 
certain crimes. In the end, a pragmatic decision was taken by the core 
drafters to exclude a reference to the abolition of the death penalty, 
because it was believed that it would be unpalatable to many states 
and would be unlikely to receive the broad support of the African 
Commission, which would reduce the chances that the document 
would be adopted by this body. Unfortunately, this discussion marked 
the beginning of some tension among the workshop participants and 
frustrated many of the participants who disagreed with the decision.39
4.2  Corporal punishment
Another issue that caused perhaps even more disagreement than 
the issue of the death penalty among the participants related to 
corporal punishment. The first working draft presented to the group 
stated simply ‘[a]bolish all forms of judicial corporal punishment’.40 
A few members of the group were of the opinion that there was 
insufficient recognition under international law that judicial corporal 
punishment fell within the scope of the prohibition of torture and 
other ill-treatment. A long debate took place about the existence of a 
large body of jurisprudence and expert opinion at the international, 
36 Ideas and principles (n 25 above) 1.
37 As above.
38 See art 6 ICCPR.
39 Since the adoption of the Robben Island Guidelines in 2002, the African 
Commission’s position on the application of the death penalty has been clarified, 
in particular with the adoption of a Resolution in 2008 calling for a moratorium on 
the death penalty, Resolution 136, and the establishment of a Working Group on 
the Death Penalty in 2005.
40 Ideas and principles (n 25 above) 1.
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regional and national levels, which recognised that forms of corporal 
punishment amounted to torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment. For example, the definition of torture under 
article 1 of CAT has been interpreted by the UN Committee against 
Torture, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other experts and 
commentators on international human rights law as extending to 
forms of corporal punishment.41 In the end, the RIG does not include an 
express reference to the prohibition of corporal punishment. However, 
a compromise was reached by making reference to states ensuring 
that ‘acts that fall within the definition of torture, based on article 1 of 
the UN Convention against Torture, are offences within their national 
legal systems’.42 Therefore, it was felt by the core drafting group that 
this reference to article 1 of CAT would be a pragmatic way to ensure 
that acts of corporal punishment would in fact be covered by the RIG, 
albeit in an indirect way, because of the interpretation of article 1 of 
CAT by the Committee against Torture and other experts to cover acts 
of judicial corporal punishment.43
4.3  Universal jurisdiction
Another issue which caused great tension within the working 
group was the inclusion of a reference to states exercising universal 
jurisdiction over acts of torture. One participant in particular was 
strongly opposed to this reference. It had not been anticipated that 
this would be a controversial issue by the APT and the core drafting 
group because universal jurisdiction over acts of torture is recognised 
within the provisions of CAT.44 However, it was clear that in order to 
achieve consensus on a text, a compromise would have to be made. 
Thus it was decided within the core drafting group that the express 
reference to universal jurisdiction would be deleted and, instead, article 
5(2) of CAT, which provides that state parties shall take all measures 
necessary to exercise universal jurisdiction over acts of torture, would 
be expressly mentioned. Accordingly, a provision was inserted into 
the RIG which states that ‘[n]ational courts should have jurisdictional 
41 See Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on Saudi Arabia, UN 
Doc CAT/C/CR/28/5, 2000 para 8(b); Committee against Torture Concluding 
Observations on South Africa, UN Doc CAT/C/ZAF/10/1, 2006 para 25; Report of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, UN Doc e/cn.4/1997/7, 10 January 1997.
42 See provision 4 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
43 Since the adoption of the Robben Island Guidelines, the African Commission 
has also determined that ‘there is no right for individuals, and particularly the 
government of a country to apply physical violence to individuals for offences. 
Such a right would be tantamount to sanctioning state-sponsored torture under 
the [African] Charter and contrary to the very nature of this human rights treaty.’ 
See Doebbler v Sudan (2003) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2003) para 42.
44 See art 5 of CAT.
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competence to hear cases of allegations of torture in accordance with 
article 5(2) of the UN Convention against Torture’.45
4.4  Immunity
Linked to the issue of universal jurisdiction over acts of torture, a 
further highly-contentious aspect of the text was whether there 
should be a provision that ensures that former heads of state cannot 
rely on immunity from prosecution for acts of torture. The inclusion 
of a provision reflecting this position was strongly opposed by at least 
one participant, whereas others were equally certain that the text 
should take a strong position against immunity. This debate took place 
within the context of emerging jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, 
in particular the 1999 decision of the House of Lords in the United 
Kingdom regarding the case brought against the former Chilean 
head of state, Augusto Pinochet, wherein the House of Lords held, 
inter alia, that former heads of state could not rely upon immunity 
for certain crimes against humanity, including torture.46 The statutes 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, as well as the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, were also used to demonstrate an emerging opinion 
that former heads of state could not rely upon immunity from 
prosecution for acts of torture.47
This debate may also have been triggered by a prominent case 
brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against Belgium, which was 
being considered at the same time as the RIG workshop. This case 
involved an international arrest warrant issued against the incumbent 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC.48 This case had received a lot 
of attention both within the region and internationally and no doubt 
had an impact on the views of some of the participants in the working 
group.
The deadlock on this issue was overcome by including a provision 
within the RIG, which calls upon states to49
45 See provision 6 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
46 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2001] 
1 AC 61; R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
[No 3] [2001] 1 AC 147 (Pinochet [No 3]).
47 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia UN 
Doc S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994); and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
A/CONF 183/9 (1994).
48 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium) (Merits), 14 February 2002, http://
www.icj-cij.org 23 September 2002, para 54.
49 Provision 16(b) of the Robben Island Guidelines. Universal jurisdiction and immunity 
remain controversial issues within Africa in light of the number of decisions being 
handed down by the International Criminal Court against individuals from Africa.
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ensure that there is no immunity from prosecution for nationals suspected 
of torture, and that the scope of immunities for foreign nationals who are 
entitled to such immunities be as restrictive as possible under international 
law.
4.5   Definition of torture
The final issue that stimulated a lot of debate was whether the 
document should include a definition of torture and, if so, whether the 
definition contained in article 1 of CAT50 should be used or whether 
another definition should be considered. The majority of participants 
maintained that it was better to avoid elaborating a definition because 
it could lead to conflicting definitions and confusion. It was therefore 
agreed to include an express reference to article 1 of CAT, which 
contains an internationally-recognised definition of the crime of 
torture.51
4.6  Access to family members
As noted earlier, there were also a few provisions that were not 
contentious but are notable because they were highlighted as being 
particularly relevant to combating torture and other ill-treatment in 
Africa. The first of these provisions was the need to include an express 
reference to ensuring that people deprived of their liberty have access 
to family members as soon as possible after their detention. This was 
stressed as being an essential provision because in many African states, 
detainees rely heavily, and in some instances exclusively, on family 
members to provide them with food and clothing while in detention. 
The final provision requires that states should ‘[e]nsure that all persons 
deprived of their liberty have access to legal and medical services and 
assistance and have the right to be visited by and correspond with 
family members’.52
4.7  Prohibition on the use, production and trade of equipment
A further issue that was regarded as particularly important to include 
was a reference to prohibiting the use, production and trade of 
50 Art 1(1) of CAT reads as follows: ‘For the purposes of this Convention, the term 
“torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating 
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions.’
51 See provision 4 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
52 See provision 31 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
ahrlj-2012-2-text.indd   326 2013/03/01   9:07 AM
equipment for the infliction of torture or other ill-treatment. This was 
seen as a crucial element because many African states import or use 
policing and security equipment that is either designed to inflict or is 
used in such a manner that it inflicts suffering. Examples of such forms 
of equipment are means of restraints such as fixed wall restraints; 
metal leg cuffs; metal thumb cuffs; ‘belly chains’; as well as electric 
shock devices.
A reference to adopting ‘national legislation prohibiting the use, 
production and trade of equipment designed to inflict torture or 
ill-treatment’ had already been included in the preliminary draft 
prepared by the APT and had been influenced by the Guidelines on EU 
Policy towards Third Countries on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,53 as well as the 2001 UN 
General Assembly Resolution on Torture.54 This language was altered 
slightly during the drafting process and the final text included the 
following provision:55
States should prohibit and prevent the use, production and trade of 
equipment or substances designed to inflict torture or ill-treatment and 
the abuse of any other equipment or substance to these ends.
5  Final text
The final text adopted was entitled Guidelines and Measures for the 
Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines). The 
RIG contain 50 provisions divided into three main parts dealing with 
the prohibition of torture, the prevention of torture, and responding 
to the needs of victims. As noted earlier, in the end the final product 
does not resemble a ‘plan of action’, as originally proposed by the APT, 
detailing ‘concrete measures and policies’ aimed at the prevention 
of torture.56 Instead, the RIG are a compilation of standards and 
principles mainly derived from other existing international hard and 
soft law instruments; some of the provisions are worded very precisely 
while others are expressed in more general and broad terms.
Accordingly, the RIG are illustrative of the ‘infinite variety’ of soft 
law.57 The RIG are a ‘patchwork’ of provisions that straddle some of 
the broad categories of and purposes for developing soft law that 
53 See Guidelines on EU Policy towards Third Countries on Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the Council of the 
European Union on 9 April 2001.
54 See UN Doc A/RES/56/143 3 para 11.
55 See provision 14 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
56 See Ideas and principles (n 25 above).
57 See R Baxter ‘International law in her infinite variety’ (1980) 29 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 549-566.
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many commentators have identified.58 For example, it has been 
noted that soft law can be used as a tool to elaborate on obligations 
found in binding instruments and indeed many provisions of the 
RIG do elaborate on the general prohibition on torture and other ill-
treatment found in article 5 of the African Charter.59 However, some 
of the provisions of the RIG are not specific enough to fully satisfy this 
purpose and have themselves required further elaboration.60
In addition, as Shelton notes, some soft law can have normative 
content,61 and indeed, some of the provisions of the RIG contain what 
can be considered to be ‘hard law’ obligations, many of which are 
derived from existing international treaties, in particular CAT and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).62 Yet, 
numerous provisions of the RIG mirror or reference other international 
soft law instruments and commitments and do not appear to be 
intended to have normative effect but are more promotional in 
character.63
This multifaceted nature of the RIG, however, raises a problem in 
that prima facie it can be difficult to pinpoint the exact purpose of the 
RIG. It is suggested that this is one reason for the lack of impact of the 
RIG to date within the region.
Looking in more detail at the provisions of the RIG, as noted above, 
they are divided into three sections. The first part looks at measures 
aimed at the prohibition of torture. This section contains 19 provisions 
dealing with issues relating to the ratification of regional and 
international instruments; promoting and supporting co-operation 
with international mechanisms, the criminalisation of torture, non-
refoulement, combating impunity, and complaints and investigation 
procedures. Nine out of these 19 provisions either restate or paraphrase 
obligations already contained in CAT.64
58 See A Boyle ‘Some reflections on the relationship between treaties and soft law’ 
(1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 901-909.
59 See eg provisions 4-15 of the Robben Island Guidelines which are derived from 
CAT and ICCPR.
60 See eg provisions 33 and 34 of the Robben Island Guidelines. Guidelines were 
published by the APT, the East Africa Regional Office of the Office of High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the African Commission in order to provide 
a commentary on the provisions and how they could be implemented at the 
national level. See Robben Island Guidelines for the Prohibition and Prevention of 
Torture in Africa: A practical guide for implementation (2008) http://www.achpr.
org/english/_info/index_RIG_Under_en.htm (accessed 31 October 2012).
61 See Shelton (n 16 above) 2.
62 See eg provision 4 of the Robben Island Guidelines which provides: ‘States should 
ensure that acts, which fall within the definition of torture, based on article 1 of the 
UN Convention against Torture, are offences within their national legal systems.’
63 See eg provision 42 which provides that states should ‘encourage and facilitate 
visits by NGOs to places of detention’.
64 See provisions 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18 & 19 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
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Other provisions within this section contain more general language 
calling on states to ratify relevant treaties or to co-operate with the 
African Commission and UN bodies.65
The second section is the largest and contains 28 provisions aimed 
at the prevention of torture. Once again, some of these provisions 
either restate or are influenced by obligations found in other treaties 
such as CAT and ICCPR.66
Other provisions within this section make an express reference to 
existing international soft law instruments which set out minimum 
standards and safeguards relating to the treatment of persons deprived 
of their liberty and calls on states to ensure that any measures taken 
are either in conformity with these instruments or are guided by them.
In addition, the origins of some of the provisions can also be traced 
back to other forms of soft law such as General Comments and 
decisions made by the UN treaty bodies, in particular the UN Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), or opinions expressed by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture. For example, provision 24 prohibits the use 
of incommunicado detention. While international standards do not 
expressly prohibit incommunicado detention in all circumstances, 
restrictions are placed upon its use and the HRC has stated in its 
General Comment 20 that ‘prolonged incommunicado detention 
may facilitate the perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute 
a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’.67 The Special 
Rapporteur on Torture has also called for incommunicado detention 
to be prohibited.68
The final section of the RIG looks at responding to the needs of 
victims and contains only three provisions. The first provision considers 
issues relating to the safety of alleged victims of torture and other ill-
treatment, as well as witnesses, those conducting investigations, other 
human rights defenders and families. This provision was included in 
the preliminary draft prepared by the APT and was influenced by 
article 13 of CAT, as well as the practice of the UN Special Procedures, 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the ICRC.
The second provision within this section recalls the obligation for 
states to offer reparation to victims of torture and other ill-treatment 
and their dependants. This provision reflects article 14 of CAT.
Finally, the RIG end with a provision which recognises that families 
and communities which have been affected by torture and other 
ill-treatment can also be considered victims. This provision, and 
particularly the inclusion of ‘communities’ within the category of 
65 See provisions 1, 2 & 3 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
66 See provisions 20, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35 & 36 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
67 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 
(2003) para 11.
68 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/434 para 
926(d).
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possible victims of torture and other ill-treatment, reflects discussions 
in the workshop concerning the impact of acts of violence on the 
wider community both from the perspective of obtaining adequate 
justice for victims of violence and the punishment and re-integration 
of perpetrators.69
It can be seen from the above that many of the provisions of the RIG 
can be traced directly back to obligations contained in international 
treaties or standards contained in existing international soft law 
instruments, as well as General Comments and decisions made by 
UN treaty bodies and the Special Rapporteur on Torture. As such, 
aside from their title, the provisions of the RIG are not in themselves 
readily identifiable with the region. For example, they do not draw on 
African instruments or jurisprudence but on UN documents, and in 
a few instances on instruments from other regions,70 and apart from 
the odd provision on the involvement of families which may reflect the 
African reality, and those on the death penalty and immunity which 
reflect African states’ reluctance to accept these issues, it is hard to 
identify an ‘African’ approach or indeed one which differs significantly 
from the international instruments upon which it heavily draws.
One of the reasons for this is that the international standards that have 
been developed to protect people deprived of their liberty are universal 
in nature and it was not the intention of the APT, or the majority of the 
participants of the workshop, to develop new standards for Africa, 
which may have raised controversial issues relating to cultural relativity 
and may have resulted in weaker standards than those provided for in 
the international instruments. However, to some extent it might be 
the safeguards that have been left out or obliquely referenced that 
are perhaps most striking and indicative of the context within which 
they were elaborated and concepts which were considered difficult to 
obtain consensus on within the region. For example, as noted above, 
a reference to the abolition of the death penalty had to be deleted 
and references to judicial corporal punishment, universal jurisdiction, 
and head of state immunity were very contentious and compromise 
language had to be found for these issues.
The RIG have been described as ‘representing a consensus of 
opinion and shared goals among African states ’.71 Yet, states were not 
involved in the process that led to their drafting nor to their adoption 
by the African Commission. Thus, this claim stems solely from the 
endorsement of the RIG in 2003 by the African Union Assembly of 
69 See eg Father Lapsley ‘Measures required on rehabilitation and reparation. The 
case of South Africa’ in ‘Preventing torture in Africa‘ (n 30 above) 131-138; and the 
opening speech to the workshop on the Robben Island Guidelines by Dr P Maduna 
in ‘Preventing torture in Africa’ (n 30 above) 51-56.
70 See provision 14 of the Robben Island Guidelines which closely mirrors language 
used in the Guidelines on EU Policy towards Third Countries on Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (n 53 above).
71 See Niyizurugero & Lissène (n 32 above) 93.
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Heads of State and Government when they approved the Activity 
Report of the African Commission, which contained the Resolution 
on the RIG.72 Notwithstanding the lack of engagement with states, 
the RIG are expressly intended to modify state behaviour. Thus, prima 
facie, the RIG could be regarded as falling within a category of soft 
law instruments that have been described as ‘controversial claimants’ 
to international soft law status, namely, those instruments that do 
not emanate either directly or indirectly from states, but which are 
nevertheless intended to modify transnational behaviour.73
However, the claim to soft law status by the RIG has not in practice 
been controversial and it would appear that the adoption of the RIG 
by the African Commission has, as intended by the APT, given the 
RIG a certain political legitimacy, at least within the regional human 
rights system, so that the RIG are regarded by the African Commission 
and perceived by others as being a soft law instrument of the African 
Commission. Unfortunately, this ‘ownership’ over the RIG has not 
so far resulted in the African Commission usefully deploying the RIG 
within their activities.
6  Adoption of the RIG by the African Commission
At the end of the drafting workshop, the participants agreed upon 
and adopted a statement which made a number of recommendations 
directed towards the African Commission. This statement recom-
mended that the African Commission took the following action:74
(i) adopt a resolution endorsing the Robben Island Guidelines;
(ii) consider organising an orientation seminar with the support of 
other interested organisations to explain and present the Robben 
Island Guidelines to national and regional stakeholders;
(iii) include on its agenda an item on the issue of torture in order to 
reflect strategies for its prohibition and prevention;
(iv) consider including the issue of torture in the mandates of its Special 
Rapporteurs as well as incorporating torture on the checklist of 
commissioners during their promotional missions; and
(v) raise awareness of the Robben Island Guidelines in order to 
complement the work of other stakeholders.
This statement and the RIG were presented and discussed at the NGO 
Forum held prior to the 31st ordinary session of the African Commission 
in May 2002. The NGO Forum supported the final output of the 
workshop and submitted a draft resolution to the African Commission, 
72 See African Union Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.11 (II).
73 C Chinkin ’Normative development in the international legal system’ in Shelton (n 
16 above) 29.
74 See ‘Preventing torture in Africa’ (n 30 above) 171.
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recommending that they endorse the RIG during their 31st ordinary 
session. While there was broad support among the commissioners 
for the RIG, the resolution to adopt the RIG was presented at a time 
when there was an internal debate within the African Commission 
concerning the means by which the obligations contained within 
the African Charter should be developed and elaborated.75 Some 
commissioners considered that the commitments contained within the 
African Charter should be elaborated by developing protocols to the 
Charter instead of resolutions adopted by the African Commission, as 
had been the practice up until that time.76 Consequently, consideration 
of the RIG, along with other similar processes concerning freedom of 
expression and fair trials, was postponed until the next scheduled 
ordinary session of the African Commission in November 2002.77
In order to garner support for the RIG during this hiatus in the 
adoption process and to apply pressure on the African Commission to 
adopt them, the APT took part in an international seminar on torture, 
organised by the International Federation of Christians Against Torture 
(FIACAT), in July 2002 in Dakar, Senegal. One of the recommendations 
arising out of this international seminar was a call for the African 
Commission to adopt the RIG at their 32nd ordinary session.78
Accordingly, the APT submitted a draft resolution endorsing the 
RIG to the African Commission at their 32nd ordinary session, held 
between 17 and 23 October 2002. This time the African Commission 
approved the resolution and adopted the RIG.79
The aim of this resolution was not only to ensure that there was 
political support from the African Commission for the RIG, but it also 
set out the intention to create a special mechanism in the form of a 
Follow-Up Committee for the RIG comprising representatives of the 
African Commission, the APT and any other prominent African experts 
as the Commission may determine.80 The resolution also set out the 
mandate for the Follow-Up Committee, namely, that it was to organise 
seminars to disseminate the RIG, to develop and propose strategies 
to the African Commission on the promotion and implementation 
of the RIG, and to promote and facilitate the implementation of the 
RIG within member states.81 In addition, the resolution called upon 
the Special Rapporteurs and members of the African Commission to 
75 Interview with Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, 10 November 2009.
76 As above.
77 As above.
78 See the final declaration of the international seminar on torture ‘Working together 
for an end to torture in Africa’ http://www.fiacat.org/en/spip.php?article217 
(accessed 31 October 2012).
79 See Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention 
of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (n 1 
above).
80 As above. 
81 As above.
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widely disseminate the RIG, encouraged state parties to the African 
Charter to consider the RIG in their periodic reports to the African 
Commission, and invited NGOs and other relevant actors to widely 
disseminate and utilise the RIG in the course of their work.82
The proposal to establish a Follow-Up Committee is an interesting 
aspect of the resolution because, as discussed earlier, in its statement 
to the African Commission in 2000 the APT had called upon the 
Commission to establish some form of special mechanism to consider 
the prevention of torture and other ill-treatment. Thus, the RIG became 
the hook by which this could be achieved by calling for a committee to 
be established to promote them and to monitor their implementation.
Some of the participants of the workshop believed at the time of 
the workshop that the instrument to be drafted should either directly 
establish or pave the way for the establishment of a monitoring body 
within the African Commission along similar lines to the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture.83 (As noted earlier, the APT 
had been instrumental in the adoption of the European Convention 
on the Prevention of Torture and the establishment of the CPT as part 
of their regional strategy on CAT.)84 However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the APT had ever intended to establish an African version 
of the European CPT. In the end, the establishment of a Follow-Up 
Committee was not discussed at length during the drafting workshop 
due to the pressures of time and the difficulty in obtaining agreement 
on the content of the final output of the workshop. Nevertheless, the 
APT were of the opinion that any instrument arising out of the drafting 
workshop would require some kind of follow-up body in order to 
ensure that the instrument would not ‘be forgotten about’.85
The decision to establish a committee on the RIG instead of a Special 
Rapporteur was an unusual one at that time. Previously, the position of 
Special Rapporteur had been the common form of special mechanism 
to consider thematic issues. However, the endorsement of the RIG 
took place at the same time as the use of the Special Rapporteur 
system of the African Commission was under review because it was 
considered by the Commission that this type of mechanism had not 
been very successful.86 While this review was being conducted, the 
African Commission decided to appoint focal persons as a ‘stop-gap 
measure’ for projects that were already underway until the review 
82 As above. 
83 Interview with Prof Renate Kicker, 9 March 2009; interview with Mr Jean-Baptiste 
Niyizurugero, 10 November 2009.
84 For more details on the role played by the APT in the establishment of the CPTA, see 
The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture: A manual for prevention 
(2004) 35-36.
85 Interview with Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, 10 November 2009.
86 See 17th Annual Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
2003-2004, para 32.
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had been concluded.87 This moratorium on establishing Special 
Rapporteurs may have led the APT and commissioners involved with 
the RIG to consider establishing an alternative mechanism by which 
to monitor the implementation of the RIG. The decision to create a 
Follow-Up Committee also had a further potential advantage over a 
Special Rapporteur mechanism, in that it enabled more individuals, 
including the APT, to be directly involved with activities to take the 
RIG forward under the auspices of the African Commission, which in 
turn had the potential to provide additional resources and guidance 
for activities on the RIG. In practice, however, this extra support did 
not materialise.
Following the adoption of this resolution and the corresponding 
endorsement of the RIG by the African Commission at its 32nd 
ordinary session, no further official action was taken to establish 
the Follow-Up Committee until the 33rd ordinary session of the 
African Commission, held in May 2003. At this session, the African 
Commission requested the Secretariat of the Commission to circulate 
amongst all the commissioners a list of nominees for election as 
members of the Follow-Up Committee. It was anticipated that the 
Follow-Up Committee would be established at the 34th ordinary 
session of the African Commission in November 2003.88 Proposals 
for possible candidates were to be submitted to the Secretariat of the 
African Commission. In practice, the list of names of candidates for the 
Follow-Up Committee was compiled by the Secretariat of the African 
Commission in consultation with the APT and other key members of 
the drafting workshop.
Pending the anticipated establishment of the Follow-Up Committee, 
it was decided to appoint the Vice-Chairperson of the African 
Commission, Commissioner Jainaba Johm, and Commissioner Andrew 
Chigovera to act as focal persons and undertake activities aimed 
at implementing the resolution and disseminating the RIG. Their 
mandate covered the six-month inter-sessional period between the 
33rd and 34th ordinary sessions of the African Commission.89
During this interim period, in order to take advantage of the 
momentum created by the adoption of the RIG, the APT, in collaboration 
with the African Commission, decided to officially launch the RIG in 
a parallel event during the African Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government meeting in July 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique. This was 
seen as a good opportunity to publicise and build political support 
for the RIG as an ‘African-owned’ instrument to prevent torture and 
continue to apply pressure to establish a special mechanism for the 
87 As above.
88 African Commission Report on the Consultative Meeting on the Implementation 
of the Robben Island Guidelines held from 8-9 December 2003, Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso, African Union, 2. 
89 As above.
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RIG within the African Commission.90 The official launch of the RIG at 
the African Assembly of Heads of State and Government summit took 
place on 11 July 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique.
At the 34th ordinary session of the African Commission, held 
in November 2003, the Commission was unable to establish the 
Follow-Up Committee as expected because it was taking longer than 
anticipated to get the list of possible candidates completed and agreed 
upon.91 Accordingly, it was decided to nominate Commissioner Sanji 
Monageng as the focal person within the African Commission to 
undertake activities to promote and implement the RIG until the next 
session of the African Commission which was due to take place in May 
2004.92
However, the APT had already submitted a proposal to the African 
Commission prior to the 34th ordinary session to hold a consultative 
meeting in December 2003 in anticipation that the Follow-Up 
Committee would have been established. The idea behind this 
consultative meeting was to provide what would have been the 
newly-established Follow-Up Committee with a forum to draw up a 
strategy and plan of action for its future work. While the process to 
establish a Follow-Up Committee was delayed, the African Commission 
nevertheless decided to continue with this consultative meeting 
on the understanding that the outcome of such a meeting would 
be conveyed to the members of the Follow-Up Committee when 
elected.93 The consultative meeting was organised jointly by the APT 
and the African Commission and took place in Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso, from 8 to 9 December 2003. The consultative meeting brought 
together a small number of experts from the African Commission and 
civil society to discuss these objectives.94
The final outcome of this meeting was the elaboration of a series 
of recommendations (commonly known as the Ouagadougou 
Recommendations) aimed at assisting the national implementation 
of the RIG. This document is quite detailed and sets out a general 
comment on each of the provisions of the RIG, followed by a series of 
questions that could be used by various actors to ascertain the extent 
to which each provision has been complied with at the national level, 
and lastly a set of recommendations for action by states, the African 
90 Interview with Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, 10 November 2009.
91 As above.
92 Report on the Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the Robben Island 
Guidelines (n 88 above) 3.
93 As above.
94 The participants included Commissioner Sanji Monageng; Leila Zerrougoui, 
Chairperson of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; Vincent Zakane, 
representative of the Ministry for the Promotion of Human Rights of Burkina Faso; 
Honore Tougouri, representative of the Association Penitentaire Africaine (APA); 
Malick Sow, co-ordinator of the Senegalese Human Rights Commission; and Jean-
Baptiste Niyizurugero, Africa Programme Officer for the APT.
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Commission and civil society.95 Unfortunately, this document has not 
been widely disseminated notwithstanding its obvious value to those 
working on issues relating to the prevention of torture and other ill-
treatment and remains a largely-unknown document. However, in 
2008, the APT secured funding to use the output of this Ouagadougou 
meeting to develop a practical guide on the implementation of the 
RIG.96
At its 35th ordinary session, held between 21 May and 4 June 
2004, the African Commission finally agreed upon the establishment 
of the Follow-Up Committee on the implementation of the RIG and 
designated the first members of the Follow-Up Committee.97 In 
accordance with the 2002 resolution for the adoption of the RIG, the 
Follow-Up Committee was assigned the following mandate:98
• to organise, with the support of interested partners, seminars 
to disseminate the Robben Island Guidelines to national and 
regional stakeholders;
• to develop and propose to the African Commission strategies 
to promote and implement the Robben Island Guidelines at the 
national and regional levels;
• to promote and facilitate the implementation of the Robben 
Island Guidelines within member states; and
• to make a progress report to the African Commission at each 
ordinary session.
The first meeting of the Follow-Up Committee did not take place until 
18 and 19 February 2005 and was funded and hosted by the School 
of Law at the University of Bristol. At this first working session of the 
Follow-Up Committee, the members adopted their internal rules 
and procedures and sought to interpret and elaborate their mandate 
by developing another programme of activities that the Follow-Up 
Committee would undertake. At this meeting, the members set out 
a number of ways in which the Follow-Up Committee would engage 
95 Report on the Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the Robben Island 
Guidelines (n 88 above), Annex 1.
96 J-B Niyizurugero & GP Lessène Robben Island Guidelines for the Prohibition and 
Prevention of Torture in Africa: A practical guide for implementation (2008).
97 The first members were Commissioner Ms Sanji Monageng, elected Chairperson 
of the Follow-Up Committee; Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, elected Vice-
Chairperson of the Follow-up Committee – Programme Officer for Africa, APT; 
Mrs Hannah Forster, African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies 
(ACDHRS); Mrs Leila Zerrougui, Magistrate and Professor of Law at the National 
Institute of Magistracy in Algiers and Chairperson of the United Nations Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention; Advocate Ms Karen McKenzie, Director of the 
Independent Complaints Directorate of South Africa; and Mr Malick Sow, Executive 
Secretary of the Senegalese Committee of Human Rights.
98 See Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention 
of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (n 1 
above).
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with states, NGOs, national human rights institutions, and UN bodies 
and agencies.
The main programme of activities to be used by the Follow-Up 
Committee to facilitate its efforts in reaching its objective of promoting 
the RIG and their implementation was described as follows:99
• organising seminars, campaigns and training sessions in countries 
to promote the Robben Island Guidelines and to ensure their 
dissemination;
• publishing position papers and articles relating to the Guide lines;
• identifying pilot countries and pilot projects for case studies;
• organising activities in pilot countries in order to stimulate and 
initiate national plans of action for implementation of the Robben 
Island Guidelines;
• conducting studies and research on issues relating to themes 
developed in the Robben Island Guidelines in order to develop 
strategies to promote the implementation of the Robben Island 
Guidelines at national and regional levels and producing policy 
documents for adoption by the African Commission; and
• publication and dissemination of the Ouagadougou 
Recom mendations.
Despite the elaboration of this comprehensive programme of activities 
and strategy for its work, in practice, between 2005 and 2008 the 
Follow-Up Committee did not implement this plan. There were a 
number of reasons for this. First, there was a general lack of funds 
provided for all the special mechanisms of the African Commission.100 
Secondly, the legal officer of the African Commission assigned to the 
Follow-Up Committee left her position and for a period of time there 
was no staff assigned to the Follow-Up Committee.101 Lastly, with the 
adoption of OPCAT by the UN General Assembly in 2002, the APT’s 
priorities and regional strategy changed in order to focus on a global 
ratification campaign on OPCAT.102 In November 2007, Commissioner 
Dupe Atoki, a lawyer from Nigeria, was elected as Chairperson of 
the Follow-Up Committee and in April 2008, the University of Bristol 
facilitated a second meeting of the Follow-Up Committee, which took 
place in Cape Town, South Africa. The purpose of this second meeting 
was to review the progress of the Follow-Up Committee so far, and 
to draw up another plan of action for the promotion, dissemination 
and implementation of the RIG. The Chairperson of the Follow-Up 
Committee reported to the 43rd ordinary session of the African 
Commission in May 2008 that at this second meeting, three countries 
99 Report of the First Working Session of the Follow-up Committee on the Implementation 
of the Robben Island Guidelines 7.
100 Interview with Mr Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, 10 November 2009.
101 As above.
102 As above.
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had been identified for pilot activities (although the names of these 
countries were not shared in this report), and that it had been decided 
to arrange another meeting of the Follow-Up Committee to be held 
in Nigeria.103 Consequently, in July 2008, using additional funding 
given to the African Commission by the African Union, the Follow-Up 
Committee undertook its first official in-country activity when it held a 
sub-regional training and sensitisation workshop in Nigeria for heads 
of police and prisons within West African states.104 Unfortunately, no 
report has been prepared of this workshop so its findings are unknown.
Between 2008 and 2009, the Follow-Up Committee carried out 
a few promotional missions. The first was to Liberia between 4 and 
6 September 2008; the second was to Uganda between 25 and 
27 October 2009;105 and a third was carried out to Benin between 
21 and 23 October 2009.106 Unfortunately, no mission reports have 
been prepared and therefore the only information available on these 
missions is contained in the inter-sessional activity reports presented 
by the Chairperson of the Committee. From these reports it is clear, first 
of all, that the visits were very short, on average three days. They also 
all involved a one or two-day workshop to promote the RIG among 
government officials, police and prison personnel and, in respect of 
Uganda and Benin, also NGOs.
In November 2009, a resolution was adopted to change the name 
of the Follow-Up Committee to the Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture in Africa (CPTA), in order to address the ambiguity in the 
previous title and ensure that the special mechanism was clearly 
identifiable as having a mandate to look at the prevention of torture in 
Africa. Following the adoption of this resolution, four of the members 
of the Follow-Up Committee were re-appointed as members of the 
CPTA and one commissioner was newly appointed to join the CPTA.107
As well as having almost exactly the same members as the Follow-Up 
Committee, the CPTA has also inherited the same mandate which, 
as outlined above, is stated in rather general terms and combines a 
mixture of activities aimed at promotion and advocacy. Accordingly, 
103 See Report of Activities by Commissioner Dupe Atoki, 2008 1-2 http://www.
AfricanCommission.org/english/Commissioner%27s%20Activity/43rd%20OS/
Special%20Rapporteurs/robben%20Island%20Guidelines.pdf
 (accessed 31 October 2012).
104 See Report of Activities by Commissioner Dupe Atoki delivered at the 43rd ordinary 
session of the African Commission 2.
105 See Activity Report of the Chairperson of the Follow-up Committee of the Robben 
Island Guidelines, delivered at the 46th ordinary session of the African Commission 
1-2.
106 As above.
107 Commissioner Musa Ngary Bitaye was appointed as a member of the newly-
named CPTA but has since retired as a commissioner. The members of the CPTA 
as at October 2012 are Commissioner Dupe Atoki, Chairperson; Mr Jean-Baptiste 
Niyizurugero, Vice-Chairperson; Mr Malick Sow, re-appointed as a member; and 
Ms Hannah Forster, re-appointed as a member.
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the change is in name only and the CPTA continues to work within the 
scope of the mandate established for the Follow-Up Committee.
Unfortunately, similarly to its predecessor, the CPTA has also, at 
the time of writing, largely failed to carry out much of its mandate as 
articulated in the 2002 resolution.
It was anticipated that creating a special mechanism to promote 
and monitor the implementation of the RIG would provide the 
necessary focal point within the African Commission through which 
such a strategy could be developed. However, preliminary findings 
from our research indicate that there has been little use of the RIG, 
not only within African states but, more importantly for the purposes 
of this article, by the African Commission itself and the AU. There 
has been little reference in the state reporting procedure either 
by commissioners or states to the RIG, and limited reference in 
promotional and protective missions by commissioners. Only three 
individual communications publicly available since the adoption of the 
RIG refer to them expressly,108 yet there have been over 60 individual 
communications submitted to the African Commission since 2002 that 
involve aspects of torture and other ill-treatment.
Two of the communications that do reference the RIG do so only 
once as evidence of the African Commission’s stance on amnesty 
laws.109 However, the most recent case, that of Egyptian Initiative 
for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of Egypt, which was 
decided by the Commission in 2011, contains more references to the 
RIG and in a more substantive way. In this communication, the RIG is 
used by the complainants as evidence of the absolute prohibition of 
torture and other ill-treatment and states’ obligation to prevent these 
forms of abuse under international human rights law.110 The RIG is 
also referenced in this case by the African Commission itself during its 
analysis of the merits. The Commission uses the RIG as a reference for 
the types of safeguards to be afforded detainees,111 in particular the 
right of access to a lawyer,112 and the right to be brought promptly 
before a judicial officer.113
While these limited cases are not enough to demonstrate an evolution 
in the way in which the RIG will be used both by complainants and 
the African Commission itself within the communications procedure, 
108 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (2006) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR 
2006) para 208; Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains (MIDH) v Côte d’Ivoire 
(2008) AHRLR 62 (ACHPR 2008) para 96; and Communication 334/06 Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of Egypt, 2011, paras 109, 
112, 174, 179 & 184.
109 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (n 108 above) para 208; and Mouvement 
Ivoirien (n 108 above) para 96.
110 See Egyptian Initiative (n 108 above) paras 109 & 112.
111 Egyptian Initiative (n 108 above) para 174.
112 Egyptian Initiative (n 108 above) para 179.
113 Egyptian Initiative (n 108 above) para 184.
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the substantive use of the RIG in the Egyptian case is instructive for 
future communications and demonstrates the potential for the RIG to 
be used as an additional advocacy tool within this procedure.
In addition, although it can be argued that having the Committee 
has ensured that torture remains a constant item on the agenda of the 
African Commission at each session, and having a named figurehead 
for torture ensures that questions are asked during the state reporting 
as the Special Rapporteur and commissioners on the Committee 
usually are expected to take the lead on questions relating to their 
specific remits. On the other hand, it is likely that questions would 
have been posed on torture anyway and there is no indication that the 
questions that are asked during state reporting, for example, are any 
more nuanced or detailed than they would have been had there been 
no Committee or Guidelines.
Overall, our research findings indicate that there has been a failure 
on the part of the African Commission to use the RIG within its various 
procedures to develop a coherent message on the prevention of 
torture and other ill-treatment, and secondly a failure on the part 
of the Follow-Up Committee and now the CPTA to implement their 
mandate effectively.
7  Lessons that can be drawn from the experience of 
the Robben Island Guidelines
Overall, the history of the drafting of the RIG provides some useful 
lessons, not only for those seeking to develop soft law at the African 
Commission level, but also more generally in order to ensure that 
documents adopted at the regional and international levels maintain 
some relevance and purpose beyond their texts being finalised.
7.1  The need for a clear purpose and strategic approach
As noted earlier, while the initial idea to develop some form of regional 
document on the prevention of torture in Africa was partly aimed at 
garnering regional support for CAT and the concept of preventive 
visits it promotes, there is only a limited reference to visits to places of 
detention and CAT within the text of the RIG.
The fact that the RIG do not prima facie appear to be a piece of 
soft law designed to promote CAT or preventive visits is not in itself a 
concern. It could be argued that the broader focus of the RIG makes 
them potentially more widely applicable than if they focused more on 
preventive visits to places of detention. However, what is problematic 
is that the purpose of the RIG and how best to use them appear to 
have been unclear during the drafting process and subsequently at 
the regional level.
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The institutional setting through which soft law can be developed 
and/or promoted has been observed as being a factor that can affect 
compliance.114 As Shelton notes, institutions and mechanisms may 
foster compliance through judicial or quasi-judicial rulings and that 
‘supervisory mechanisms are crucial, especially in subject areas where 
the norm is accompanied by strong incentives not to comply’.115
Thus, the institutional setting of the RIG has an important part to 
play in the perceived status of the RIG and their implementation within 
the region. Unfortunately, the experience of the RIG exposes a major 
weakness at the institutional level, namely, that the African Commission 
has not created its own practice for strategic development, nor does 
it systematically use instruments it adopts or take responsibility for 
special mechanisms it establishes.116
7.2  Content has an impact upon implementation
Linked to the issues of purpose and strategy discussed above, the 
provisions of the RIG cover a wide variety of issues relating to the 
prohibition and prevention of torture and other ill-treatment that 
could be useful for a range of national and regional actors. Yet, many 
of their provisions are drawn from existing international hard and soft 
law instruments and their ‘added value’ as a piece of soft law has been 
questioned because it is unclear what extra the RIG can ‘bring to the 
table’.117
The RIG have been promoted as having value because they emanate 
from the region.118 However, our research findings indicate that this 
has not in fact translated into the RIG being used any more than 
international hard and soft law instruments by the African Commission, 
states and civil society organisations. Therefore, in practice it is 
arguable that the importance of the ‘African heritage’ of the RIG has 
been overstated and instead, perhaps what is more crucial as a factor 
in the level of implementation, or lack thereof, is the content of the 
RIG. Furthermore, neither is it possible to identify any link between 
the adoption of the RIG and the instances of torture across the region, 
or indeed to measure whether torture has increased or diminished 
since their adoption.
One of the reasons for developing soft law has been identified as 
to fill a gap within hard law instruments.119 The RIG would certainly 
114 Shelton (n 16 above) 14.
115 Shelton (n 16 above) 15.
116 Murray (n 9 above) 374-375.
117 See Report of a workshop for East African national human rights institutions on the 
implementation of torture prevention standards, University of Bristol 18-19 October 
2010 http://www.bristol.ac.uk/law/research/centres-themes/ihrsp/documents/
eastafricareport.pdf (accessed 31 October 2012).
118 Niyizurugero & Lissène (n 32 above) 113.
119 Chinkin (n 73 above) 30.
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appear to fit into this category and its provisions can be regarded as 
elaborating measures to implement the general prohibition of torture 
and other ill-treatment contained in article 5 of the African Charter, 
even if that was not its original intended purpose. However, the RIG 
can only be seen as filling a gap within the regional context as many 
of its provisions, as described in section 3 above, can be found in other 
international hard law instruments such as CAT and ICCPR, as well as 
international soft law instruments such as the UN Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
Furthermore, some of the provisions of the RIG are not as specific 
as those contained in these international instruments. For example, 
provision 34 of the RIG makes a general statement that states should 
‘[t]ake steps to improve conditions in places of detention, which do 
not conform to international standards’,120 whereas the UN SMR, for 
example, specifically set out the steps that should be taken to ensure 
that conditions of detention are humane. Accordingly, the RIG has 
been perceived by some civil society actors as less useful to their work, 
and they would prefer to use the more detailed hard and soft law 
instruments from the international context rather than less specific 
provisions from the region.121 As Shelton notes, ‘ambiguity and open-
endedness can limit efforts to secure compliance’.122
7.3  Support at the institutional level
As observed above, the institutional setting through which soft 
law is developed and promoted can be a factor in the overall level 
of compliance.123 The RIG are unusual among soft law instruments 
within international human rights law in that a specific mechanism was 
established in order to ‘follow up’ on them and to suggest strategies 
to assist with their implementation.
While the creation of a special mechanism has at least enabled the 
APT, and others, a formal body through which torture prevention 
issues could be raised, in practice, to date, despite holding 
approximately six strategic meetings between 2005 and 2011 where 
programmes of activities have been developed, these plans have 
largely failed to translate into concrete action. Any activities that have 
been undertaken have been broadly promotional in their focus, thus 
the more functional aspect of the Committee’s mandate, namely, ‘to 
develop and propose strategies to the African Commission to prevent 
torture and other ill-treatment at the national and regional levels’, has 
not been implemented. This is unfortunate as it is arguably this part 
of the mandate of the Committee which has the potential to have the 
120 See provision 34 of the Robben Island Guidelines.
121 Report of East African Workshop (n 117 above) 19-20.
122 Shelton (n 16 above) 14.
123 Shelton (n 16 above) 15.
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greatest impact by providing the African Commission, and others, with 
authoritative guidance and policies for strategies on the prevention of 
torture and other ill-treatment in Africa.
Successive Chairpersons of the Follow-Up Committee have 
identified a lack of funding as the reason for this inability to carry 
out the mandate fully.124 This is not unusual, and a lack of resources 
is a common complaint from the special mechanisms of the African 
Commission and the African Commission in general.125 Part of the 
reason for this is that for many years the African Commission did not 
establish a specific budget for the special mechanisms to ‘tap into’ 
in order to carry out their activities.126 This then changed with an 
increase in funding from the AU leading to the Follow-Up Committee 
carrying out its first in-country activity in 2008.
Other Special Rapporteurs and working groups at the African 
Commission have functioned effectively because funding and impetus 
have been provided by the NGO who initiated the establishment of 
the special procedure in the first place. After the adoption of the RIG in 
2002, the APT took the strategic decision not to provide funds directly 
to the Follow-Up Committee. One of the reasons for this was that the 
APT had seen the impact of the dependence of the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa on 
the support it received from Penal Reform International, so that when 
Penal Reform International were no longer in a position to provide 
financial and other assistance, the Special Rapporteur was unable to 
be as active as before. In light of this experience, the APT were of the 
opinion that the Follow-Up Committee should not be reliant on their 
financial support to function and that the African Commission needed 
to take on the responsibility of supporting the special mechanism.
Yet, the initial success of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons has been 
widely acknowledged as resulting from the support the mandate 
received from Penal Reform International. This support had not only 
enabled missions to countries to be carried out and reports to be 
published, but had also provided a source of strategic development 
for the mandate.127 This level of activity had been in stark contrast 
with the first Special Rapporteur position to be created, the Special 
Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Executions, which had not received 
external support and had been beset with problems from the start.128
Thus, at the time of the establishment of the Follow-Up Committee, 
which was only the fourth special mechanism to be established, there 
was no precedent within the history of the African Commission for 
124 See 19th Activity Report (2005) para 46 & 20th Activity Report (2006) para 39.
125 See eg 13th Activity Report 1999-2000 paras 28 & 29.
126 Murray (n 9 above) 375.
127 F Viljoen ‘Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa: 
Achievements and possibilities’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 135.
128 Harrington (n 9 above) 255-256.
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special mechanisms to function effectively without external support. 
Furthermore, it is likely that there was an expectation, based on 
previous experience with the Special Rapporteur on Prisons, that 
the APT would provide support to that body, particularly as the 
2002 resolution which calls for the establishment of the Follow-Up 
Committee specifically names the APT as being a member of the 
Committee.129 It is not unreasonable therefore to suppose that the 
African Commission was expecting the APT to provide the necessary 
resources and strategic support to this special mechanism, and was 
itself either unable or unwilling to provide adequate support to the 
Follow-Up Committee.
However, as well as wanting the Follow-Up Committee to be 
independent from the APT and fully ‘owned’ by the African Commission, 
there was also a pressing pragmatic reason for the APT’s decision not 
to provide assistance directly to the Follow-Up Committee, namely, 
that it could not afford to do so as it had to put its resources into a 
global ratification campaign for CAT.
Therefore, the support the APT has given to the Follow-Up 
Committee and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture in Africa 
has been ad hoc and limited to activities such as the arrangement 
of meetings and assistance in publishing documents. In 2010 the 
APT took the decision that the CPTA needed more support in order 
to function and they were able to secure funding to pay a monthly 
stipend for an intern to be based at the African Commission to provide 
support to the legal officer for the CPTA, to co-ordinate CPTA activities, 
and to assist with event planning and field projects; as well as a range 
of other administrative matters. However, in the middle of 2012, the 
APT withdrew its funding of this internship.
Without assistance from an NGO or other body, the Follow-Up 
Committee and the CPTA have struggled to implement their mandates 
fully. However, it is unwarranted to lay the blame on the APT for this 
failure. The African Commission had agreed to the development of an 
instrument on torture prevention, had agreed to co-chair the drafting 
workshop, had adopted the RIG and established a special mechanism 
to promote their implementation. Thus, while the idea for this strategy 
on torture prevention was not their own, the African Commission had 
stood alongside the APT in the process. The failure to subsequently 
embrace the instrument they adopted and the special mechanism 
they created is symptomatic of a general over-reliance of the African 
Commission on NGOs for the strategic development and effective 
functioning of their special mechanisms.
129 See Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention 
of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (n 1 
above).
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8  Conclusion
It can be seen from the above that the RIG are interesting as an example 
of soft law and a number of factors have had a crucial impact on the lack 
of implementation of the RIG, demonstrating that it is a combination 
of factors which determine the extent to which instruments will be 
utilised, regardless of their binding or non-binding status.130
One of the problems with the RIG is that their purpose was never 
particularly clear from the outset and, on the face of it, the RIG appear 
to serve different roles and different actors. The context and process 
within which soft law instruments are developed have been identified 
as vital factors that affect the level of compliance.131 While the RIG 
would appear to fill a gap within a binding instrument, that is, the 
African Charter, which is one of the key reasons for elaborating soft 
law instruments, it has been observed that the RIG do not have ‘added 
value’ for civil society actors working to tackle the prevention of torture 
because they either mirror existing international instruments, or they 
lack the necessary level of detail to make them a useful interpretive 
text to article 5 of the African Charter.132
Unfortunately, the institutional setting within which the RIG are 
placed, that is, the African Commission, has a poor record of using both 
binding and non-binding instruments systematically and strategically.
While the African Commission’s close relationship with NGOs 
is unique among existing human rights bodies and has been 
instrumental in many of its successes,133 it is unfortunate that 
the African Commission does not have its own policy of strategic 
development and often appears to abdicate ‘responsibility for the 
operation’ of its special mechanisms to NGOs.134 Consequently, 
the roles and responsibilities of NGOs and the African Commission 
can become blurred.135 This leaves the special mechanisms in a 
vulnerable position, as NGOs’ priorities and levels of funding can 
change from year to year.136 Unfortunately, the experience of the RIG 
has been no exception. While the APT instigated their development, 
they wanted the African Commission to assume responsibility for 
them. However, the African Commission has not done so effectively 
and has demonstrated that it is unable or unwilling to take on this 
role. Consequently, without an NGO assuming responsibility and 
providing assistance that would have enabled the special mechanism 
130 Shelton (n 16 above) 13-17.
131 Shelton (n 16 above) 14.
132 See Report of East African Workshop (n 117 above) 19-20.
133 Murray (n 9 above) 95-96.
134 Murray (n 9 above) 374.
135 As above.
136 Murray (n 9 above) 377.
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to be more effective, the RIG and their special mechanism have so far 
failed to fulfil their potential to be used by the African Commission as 
a means to develop an effective strategy on the prevention of torture 
and other ill-treatment in Africa.
Yet, despite the lack of awareness and use of the RIG, it can still 
play an important role in the region in a variety of ways. Firstly, 
there is a symbolic relevance for the RIG as an African document 
focusing specifically on the prevention of torture and other ill-
treatment in the region. This has a potential important practical 
application beyond mere symbolism. The RIG can be particularly 
useful as an advocacy tool by a range of stakeholders working in 
states that are resistant to embrace instruments emanating from 
outside of the African region.
Furthermore, as an ‘umbrella’ document bringing together key 
international standards relevant to the prohibition and prevention of 
torture and other ill-treatment, the RIG have an obvious use in training 
and advocacy, and as a blueprint for developing national action plans 
to combat these forms of abuse.137
However, the future visibility of the RIG and its impact depend on 
the role and future activities of the CPTA. Further thought therefore 
needs to be given as to how to bolster the capacity of the CPTA and its 
impact within the region.138 The Johannesburg Declaration and Plan 
of Action on the Prevention and Criminalisation of Torture in Africa, 
which was adopted by participants of a commemorative seminar 
that was held in Johannesburg to mark the tenth anniversary of the 
adoption of the RIG on 23 August 2012, sets out a number of activities 
and objectives for the CPTA, which to a certain extent provides some 
clarity regarding the purpose and future activities of the CPTA.139
Many of the provisions of this Declaration directly concerning the 
CPTA relate to the CPTA’s relationship with other vital stakeholders 
in combating torture and other ill-treatment in the region. This 
Declaration also envisages an advisory role for the CPTA and calls on 
the Committee to provide advice and technical support to national 
actors on the criminalisation of torture, the compensation of victims, 
implementation of the RIG, the ratification of OPCAT and to support 
National Preventive Mechanisms. The Declaration also calls on the 
CPTA to develop model legislation on the criminalisation of torture in 
collaboration with its partners.140
137 University of Bristol, Summary report of an expert seminar on the strategic use 
of soft law human rights documents, Bristol, 4 July 2012 11, http://www.bristol.
ac.uk/law/research/centres-themes/ihrsp/events.html (accessed 31 October 
2012).
138 n 137 above, 10.
139 See The Johannesburg Declaration and Plan of Action on the Prevention and 
Criminalisation of Torture, http://www.apt.ch/content/files/region/RIG+10%20
Seminar%20Outcome%20Document. pdf (accessed 31 October 2012).
140 n 139 above, 5-6.
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However, while the Declaration is to be welcomed, many of its 
provisions concerning the CPTA mirror previous plans of actions that 
have been developed for the CPTA and its predecessor, the Follow-Up 
Committee, in particular the 2005 Plan of Action for the Follow-Up 
Committee.141 Therefore further thought needs to be given as to 
how exactly the CPTA can concretely implement the Declaration 
and its overall mandate in order to provide the leadership on torture 
prevention that is needed at the regional and national levels in order 
to effectively combat torture and other ill-treatment in the region.
141 Report of the first working session of the Follow-up Committee on the implementation 
of the Robben Island Guidelines (n 99 above).
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